financial crisis, 3 commentators are likely to use the slogan that we need global solutions to this global problem to justify (further) convergence in corporate governance. 4 This Article examines whether national laws on corporate governance have become more similar. This focus on legal rules provides a link to the literature on the convergence of legal systems. Here too, some contend that in the modern world, legal differences, in particular the distinction between civil law and common law legal origins, have become less marked, 5 whereas others object that different legal mentalities still play an important role. 6 Modified positions are also possible. For instance, it could be said that today legal systems do not primarily differ because of different legal origins but due to their belonging to the EU, or due to the question of whether a country is developed or developing. 7 Another modification is that there is only a -weak legal origin‖ effect, which means that the effect of belonging to a particular legal origin varies over time, depending on the strength of pressures for convergence and for the -endogenization‖ of law to local conditions. 8 A crucial element of corporate governance is how well shareholders, creditors and workers are protected. This Article uses a new quantitative methodology (-leximetrics‖) 9 in order to answer the question of whether there has been convergence, divergence, or persistence of the rules on shareholder, creditor, and worker protection. In particular, this Article will analyze whether there are deep differences between the Anglo-Saxon countries (common law countries) and Continental Europe (civil law countries). The 4. For instance, with respect to financial institutions, see BASEL COMM. ON bases for this Article are three comprehensive indices for shareholder, creditor, and worker protection, which code the legal development of France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States from 1970 to 2005. Part II describes these datasets and explains how they can be used to measure convergence or divergence of the law. Part III examines the differences and similarities between the five countries in detail. This will be supplemented by Part IV, which provides a more general analysis on convergence and legal origins. Part V concludes.
Two caveats must be made. First, this Article is mainly interested in the legal rules that determine national differences of corporate governance. This focus on legal rules does not deny that their enforcement may differ between jurisdictions, or that non-legal considerations also determine corporate governance at the firm level. Secondly, this Article does not try to answer the -causality problem,‖ namely whether legal convergence (or divergence) is mainly the result of factual changes (the -law follows‖ thesis), or whether law is predominately a source of factual changes itself (the -law matters‖ thesis). This point is well discussed in previous literature. 10 This Article will, however, analyze why particular legal changes have taken place. This does not mean that the law merely reacts. Rather, this analysis makes the realistic assumption that, at least to some extent, the law is influenced by factual changes.
II. METHODOLOGY
The bases of this Article are three indices that code how well countries protect shareholders, creditors, and workers. These indices cover a wide range of variables: 60 variables for shareholder protection, 44 variables for creditor protection, and 40 variables for worker protection. 11 The indices are therefore very detailed in their legal coverage, with 144 legal variables coded for each country-year. The indices also extend over a relatively long time period: 36 years (1970 to 2005). As a limitation, however, only the laws for a small number of countries have been coded: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and India. These countries are of particular interest because they include three -parent‖ legal systems: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany; 12 the world's largest economy: the United States; and the world's largest democracy: India. Thus, in total, these three indices code for 25,920 observations. 13 The full text of these indices and data (plus detailed explanations) can be found online. 14 Here, for purposes of illustration, it is sufficient to present extracts of the shareholder protection index (Table 1) and of the French and U.K. codings (Tables 2  and 3 ).
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[Vol. 35:4 84 84 We have explained the indices and coding methodology in more detail in other articles, in particular, in which instances we allow intermediate scores and how our indices differ from indices of the previous literature. 18 We have also used these indices to determine the strength of shareholder, creditor, and worker protection in France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 19 Furthermore, it has been examined whether the strength of legal protection is reflected in a country's financial development. 20 These articles therefore respond to the -law and finance‖ literature which, based upon cross-sectional studies, claim to have proven that the -greater the protection afforded to shareholders and creditors by a country's legal system, the more external financing firms in that jurisdiction will be able to obtain.‖ 21 The methodology and content of this Article is different from these previous ones. Here, the interest is not on the aggregates of legal protection but on the differences between the five countries. For this purpose, research for this Article involved calculating the differences between each variable in the law of a particular legal system, and the same variable in the law of the other countries and adding together the absolute values of these differences. For example, the formula for the differences between shareholder protection in France and the United Kingdom is
where SPFrance1970 and SPUK1970 stand for the 60 variables on the strength of shareholder protection in 1970. 22 Equivalent formulas have been used for the other 35 years, the other nine pairs of countries, and the other two indices. All of these mathematical operations therefore lead to 36 × 10 × 3 = 1080 observations, which form the basis of this Article. These observations indicate whether the laws of two legal systems have converged or diverged. For instance, in the first set of diagrams-concerning the differences from French law 23 -the score of -0‖ would indicate that the law of a particular country would be identical to French law. Using time-series allows tracing differences between countries that have developed in the last three and a half decades. For instance, the downward trend of the curve which displays the differences between shareholder protection in France and the United Kingdom 24 means that French and U.K. law have converged in the last decades.
The past literature has distinguished between various types of convergences. In particular, in the context of the debate on globalization of corporate governance trends, a distinction is drawn between formal, functional, contractual, hybrid, normative, and institutional convergence. Gilson and Coffee assume that functional convergence is likelier than formal convergence. 25 -Functional‖ in this context means that a comparable result is produced with, say, bad managers being dismissed, but along different statutory paths. Alternatively, according to Gilson there may be contractual convergence, where the formal differences may be functionally relevant, but equivalent effects can also be reached through contractual arrangements. 26 Furthermore, the dualism between formal and functional convergence is supplemented by Rose with the concept of hybrid convergence. 27 Hybrid convergence concerns the situation where a firm -escapes‖ domestic law by shifting its registered seat to another country. 28 Outside the legal sphere, 22 . Therefore, using the data of Tables 2 and 3 one may, with Milhaupt, raise the question of -normative convergence.‖ 29 Here, -normative‖ means that the viewpoint of convergence is applied to extra-legal norms. 30 Further, Charny employs the term -institutional convergence,‖ where de facto the structures in firms become more similar. 31 This point concerns, for instance, the question of whether the shareholder ownership structure of firms changes, or firms are more frequently exposed to market influences (such as the possibility of hostile takeovers).
The methodology of this Article can show only whether there is a formal convergence, persistence, or divergence of legal rules. However, the question about formal convergence is also relevant for the other types of convergence. As long as there is formal convergence, the question of whether other forms of convergence may step in as substitutes becomes obsolete. Also, as long as there is formal convergence but de facto persistence, this can lead to further research regarding whether a -convergence of law and reality‖ may be expected in the future. 32 
III. DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
This Part uses the new indices for shareholder, creditor, and worker protection in order to examine the differences and similarities between the five countries. This will be supplemented by Part IV, which provides a more general analysis on convergence and legal origins. Part III.A analyzes how much French and German law, French and U.K. law, French and U.S. law, German and U.K. law, and German and U.S. law have differed from one another between 1970 and 2005. The differences between U.S. and U.K. law, as well as the differences from Indian law, follow in Part III.B.
A. Differences Between French and German Law
The graphs on the left hand sides of Figures 1 and 2 show the extent to which French and German law differs from the other legal systems. On the right hand side, the mean of differences from French and German law is reported. Moreover, the differences between the 1970 and 2005 scores have been calculated in order to identify whether the other legal systems have converged with, or diverged from, French or German law-a negative sign indicates convergence with French or German law and a positive sign divergence from French or German law. 
Observations
French and German law shared some similarities until the mid-1980s. With respect to worker protection, this also remained similar until 2005. However, there has been divergence in the other two areas of law. With respect to shareholder protection, this divergence has been gradual and modest; whereas with respect to creditor protection, the countries' laws diverged significantly in 1985. 35 A different picture emerges for the relationship of German and French law to U.K. law. German and U.K. law have converged in all three areas of law. Similarly, there has been some convergence of the French and U.K. law on shareholder and creditor protection. Conversely, French and U.K. law on worker protection have diverged significantly in the early 1980s, which has then however been followed by some convergence.
In five out of six categories, U.S. law is most different from French and German law. Minor convergence of French and U.S. law can be found in the protection of shareholders. With respect to creditor protection, differences were most pronounced in the early 1980s. The already quite different protection of workers in France and the United States has further diverged in the last three decades. The relationship between German and U.S. law is less unstable. There has not been a major change in the differences in worker protection, but with respect to creditor and shareholder protection, some convergence can be identified since the mid-to late-1980s.
India has mainly intermediate scores in the figures above. Thus, despite the fact that it is a common law country and the only developing country of the sample, it is no more different from German and French law than the other legal systems. A major change can be observed for creditor protection in 1987 because German and Indian law diverged, while French and Indian law converged.
Explanations
The initial similarities between French and German law in all three areas of law are likely to be a result of the civil law origins of both countries, as well as similarities in the countries' industrialization in the nineteenth century. 36 The development of the law shows, however, that these historical ties have become weaker. This is mainly the result of changes in French law-namely, the insolvency reform of 1985-and gradual improvements of shareholder protection in the 1980s and early 1990s, for instance in the area of takeover law. 37 The 1985 insolvency reform was also the main cause for the convergence of the French and U.K. law on creditor protection. 38 The divergence of French and U.K. labor law in the 1980s is a consequence of the weakening of worker protection by the conservative government in the United Kingdom, and the strengthening of worker protection by the socialist government in France. 39 Apart from that, however, German and French law have become more similar to U.K. law. This is partly a result of EU law, for instance, regarding directives on working time and fixed-term and part-time work. 40 Furthermore, since the early twenty-first century there has been some reduction in the level of worker protection in France, which has led to convergence with the United Kingdom. 41 Finally, the laws on shareholder protection show some -convergence from below.‖ 42 This means that the convergence is not mainly a result of international or regional laws (such as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance or EU Directives). 43 Rather, we can observe an evolutionary process in which national legislators aim to improve the quality of shareholder protection in a global economy. 44 This convergence in shareholder protection law also emerges from the slight decrease in differences between French and U.S. law, and German and U.S. law, since the early 1990s. This is mainly a result of the fact that France and Germany (as well as other countries) have copied a number of provisions from U.S. law. 45 To give an example, while U.S. law from 1978 required listed companies to form committees comprised of independent board members, France and Germany (as well as the United Kingdom and India) adopted similar measures later. 46 The purpose behind this -Americanization‖ of the law is the wish to attract capital. 47 U.S. law is particularly influential here, because big foreign companies are often listed on U.S. markets; U.S. institutional investors have special weight; and the United States, as a world power, can exert political pressure. 48 Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 49 has worker, shareholder, and creditor protection across five industrialized countries). 50 Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley has made U.S. law more similar to European law by making the variables on board division, public enforcement, and shareholder protection mandatory. 51 However, in general, U.S. law is quite different from French and German law. Thus, in contrast to the claim by Hansmann and Kraakman, 52 there is no -end of history‖ because other countries would now follow the U.S. model. It would be tempting to explain this with the common law origins of U.S. law and the different ownership structures of firms in the United States and in continental Europe. However, this would not be a sufficient explanation because these reasons would also apply to the United Kingdom and (to some extent) India, but the legal systems of these countries are considerably closer to French and German law. 53 Rather, it is likely that a decisive role is played by the following political factors: with respect to shareholder protection, the regulatory competition between U.S. states; 54 with respect to worker protection, a libertarian view that transcends both major political parties. 55 Finally, concerning creditor protection, one can see the impact of comprehensive reforms. These reforms were the introduction of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978, with the -debtor in possession‖ reorganization under Chapter 11; the worker-oriented French bankruptcy law of 1985; and the Indian reform of insolvency law, in force since 1987. 56 One can conclude that the growing differences between French and German law, and the growing similarities between these two countries and the United Kingdom and United States, illustrate that the ties of legal origins have been weakening. This that -two factors, economic liberalization and the fragmentation of political authority, are the primary drivers of the spread of American legal style‖ and that economic liberalization is driven by demands from U. -civilization of the common law‖ is partly, but not only, based on the influence of the EU. 57 A number of results also indicate the role of politics. 58 Due to its federal structure and a libertarian political ideology, the position of the United States is that of an outlier. Furthermore, changes in the differences in worker protection have often been driven by political events. 59 Overall, however, the differences across countries have been most stable with respect to worker protection, thus indicating stronger path dependencies. 60 
B. Differences Between U.K., U.S., and Indian Law
It may be expected that the legal rules of the three common law countries would be particularly close to each other, and quite different from French and German law. This subsection examines whether this is accurate, without restating the results about the differences between French and U.S. or U.K. law, and German and U.S. or U.K. law. Based on the new indices 61 the following figures have been created. Moreover, as in the previous part, the mean of differences and the convergence or divergence of the law are reported.
H. Patrick Glenn, La civilisation de la common law [The civilization of the common law], 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 559 (1993).
58. See supra notes 54-55 (providing authority for the proposition that U.S. political factors-regulatory competition between U.S. states and a libertarian view towards worker protection-explain the United States' legal divergence from France and Germany).
59. See Deakin et al., supra note 8, at 145 (explaining the considerable change in U.K. and French labor law and noting that -[t]he events triggering these changes were political‖).
60. For further discussion of the differences between different areas of law see infra Part IV. 61. See supra Part II (discussing the data and methodology used). 
Observations
Most of the figures display profound differences between U.S. and U.K. law. This is unambiguous for creditor protection. With respect to shareholder protection, the result depends on the perspective one takes. The figures on the differences from U.S. shareholder protection show that U.K. law is closer to U.S. law than it is to the laws of the other four countries. Yet, a different result emerges from a U.K. perspective, because the U.S. law on shareholder protection is different than the laws of the other four countries. Finally, there are some similarities in worker protection between the United States and the United Kingdom, with some convergence in the 1980s and early 1990s, and some divergence in the last ten years.
Indian and U.S. law have always been very different. From an Indian perspective, U.S. law is even more different from Indian law than French law in all three categories. By contrast, Indian and U.K. law share some similarities, particularly with respect to shareholder and creditor protection; and for shareholder protection there has even been some further convergence since the early 1990s. With respect to the differences from Indian labor law there is, however, the peculiar situation that all four curves are flat and almost identical. The Indian law on worker protection has therefore no particular similarities with any of the other countries. 
Explanations
At least today, the common-law origins of U.S. law matter only to a minor extent. 65 With respect to shareholder protection, the likely explanation is that the regulatory competition of U.S. corporate law has led to divergence of U.S. and U.K. law. 66 For instance, there are differences in the powers of their regulatory authorities, the extent of mandatory law, the availability of appraisal rights, the rules on derivative suits, and the regulation of takeovers. 67 With respect to creditor protection, the decisive event was the 1978 reform of U.S. insolvency law, 68 which moved U.S. law away from U.K. law. Although the common origins of the relatively low worker protection in the United States and the United Kingdom can still be seen today, there has also been some development in the differences between U.S. and U.K. law. These are mainly attributed to changes in U.K. law, because the conservative government reduced worker protection in the 1980s and early 1990s (and thus it converged with U.S. law), which was to some extent reversed by the Labor government in the late 1990s. 69 For the Indian law on shareholder and creditor protection, it can still be seen that India's modern law derived from the United Kingdom. 70 However, with respect to shareholder protection there has been some divergence until the mid-1990s. This was due to the Europeanization of company law in the United Kingdom, 71 the improvement of shareholder protection by the U.K. Companies Act 1985, 72 and the corporate governance codes of the 1990s. 73 In recent times, the United Kingdom and India have come closer again, mainly due to the introduction of corporate governance norms in India based on the U.K. codes. 74 With respect to creditor protection, the formal similarity between the United Kingdom and India needs to be treated with caution, because qualitative research has found that creditors have not been well protected in India. 75 In particular, judicial delays seriously impede creditor protection, because on average it takes up to 20 years for a case to be resolved. 76 Recent reforms, however, aim to improve creditor protection in India, for instance, by empowering banks and financial institutions to enforce security interests extra-judicially. 77 Worker protection is very different in India and the United Kingdom. This is mainly a result of socialist politics in the aftermath of India's independence. 78 There are no particular similarities between India and the United States in any of the three areas of law. The different political and legal climates supersede any similarities between their common law origins. 79 Finally, it may have been expected that the law of India, as a developing country, is quite different from the laws of the other four countries. That is not the case, however, because in almost all of the -differences figures‖ India displays intermediate scores.
As a result, in some respects the classification of the United Kingdom, the United States, and India as belonging to the same legal origin can still be justified today. There are similarities between the protection of shareholders and creditors in the United Kingdom and in India, and between the protection of workers in the United Kingdom and in the United States. However, the differences in all other categories make it clear that the ties of the common law family have weakened. A likely reason is that politics matter. Political events have often driven changes in the differences of worker protection, and the situation of the United States as an outlier can be explained by political factors. A further explanation may be that only in the three origin countries (United Kingdom, Germany, and France) are there complementarities between legal institutions and indigenous economic ones, which can lead to an -institutional lock-in‖ that is difficult to shift. 80 In contrast to this, there is no reason to expect a similar degree of complementarity in transplant countries, which makes fundamental changes in the law more likely.
IV. GENERAL ANALYSIS ON LEGAL ORIGINS AND CONVERGENCE
The data on the right-hand sides of Figures 1 to 5 can also be used to examine the relevance of legal origins and the convergence of legal rules from a more general perspective. Table 5 consolidates the results on the convergence and divergence of legal systems. The total figures of the three categories show that the laws have converged in shareholder protection; that they have diverged in worker protection; and that in creditor protection, converging and diverging trends evened out. 83 Thus, in contrast to Ahlering and Deakin, 84 it is not the case that institutional complementarities prevent convergence in one area of law only. Rather we observe that different areas of law are subject to different dynamics. 85 It can also be seen that convergence is a recent phenomenon. In the 1970s and 1980s, shareholder protection diverged, whereas now there is some convergence in worker protection. Among the five countries, France, Germany, and India have fairly balanced figures in all three categories. The U.K. law has converged with most of the other countries in shareholder and creditor protection. U.S. shareholder-protection law has also converged, whereas U.S. creditor-and worker-protection law has diverged from the others.
Why are there these differences between shareholder, creditor, and worker protection? A non-quantitative monograph has examined the reasons for the convergence in shareholder law in detail. 86 Among the causes of convergence, a distinction can be drawn between -convergence through congruence‖ 87 and -convergence through pressure.‖ 88 -Convergence through congruence‖ arises where the social, political, and economic bases for shareholder law become similar internationally, and thus the law also becomes more similar. 89 Convergence forces are, accordingly, the overall cultural-and economic-policy approximations, the internationalization of the economy, and approximations in legal culture and shareholder structures. 90 While in terms of consequences, path dependencies may stand in the way of rapidity and content of convergence, since here it is changes in tangible circumstances and not merely pressure from individual interest groups that set convergence going, resistance is likely to be less marked. With -convergence through pressure‖ it is particularly the regulatory competition for shareholders that makes an approximation of legal systems likely. By contrast, regulatory competition for the seat of a company and national and international lobbying will have less importance. 91 In terms of consequences, the focal point of convergence is pressure in the case of public companies, since competition for shareholders and international lobbying is stronger when more firms are dependent on international capital markets and interest groups. 92 90. Id. at 277-90, 296 (-Cultural, economic and political approximations are increasing, and may thus even be regarded as convergence forces for shareholder law.‖).
91. SIEMS, supra note 10, at 318 (explaining that regulatory competition in the international community will not result in competition for the seat of companies because, unlike in the United States, where a company can easily move its seat, this is -possible only to a limited extent‖ at the international level).
92. Id. at 317-27 (explaining that international lobbying leads to some convergence, but national lobbying is not unified enough to create a clear force of convergence). The convergence forces are summarized in Table 6 . In general, analogous forces may also be at work for creditor and worker protection. Here too, it might be the case that due to advancing globalization, national legal systems would come ever closer together. For instance, it is fair to assume that as far as we can observe an approximation of businesses, legal culture, and economic policy; legal convergence of creditor and worker protection is also likely. Here too, pressure from interest groups and other social forces 93 . Id. at 250-335 (explaining the reasons for and responses to convergence forces).
can influence the direction of the law. 94 Thus, as companies or stakeholders become more international, their pressure will also contribute to the convergence of creditor and worker protection.
However, a number of reasons can explain why, overall, we do not observe convergence in these two areas of law. First, with respect to creditor protection, creditors may operate less internationally than shareholders. Notwithstanding international project finance contracts and debt securities, debtors and creditors of a normal loan are usually based in the same country. 95 Second, countries prefer different forms of creditor protection. In a related article, the creditor protection index is decomposed into rules that (i) limit the freedom of the debtor firm to engage in activities that may harm creditors; (ii) facilitate creditor contracting for greater protection; and (iii) facilitate creditor power in bankruptcy proceedings. 96 For example, a country with high standards of minimum capital (which falls under (i)) may see no reason to change its approach to creditor protection. And even if it realizes that other forms of creditor protection are more efficient, it may remain path-dependent because the costs of changing the entire system of creditor protection may be higher than the benefits. 97 Third, the conflict between creditor and debtor interests is more contentious than the conflict between shareholders and directors. Empirical data across countries shows that shareholder interests are increasingly regarded as worth protecting, 98 whereas countries strongly differ over the question of whether insolvency law should be more debtor-or creditor-friendly. 99 Finally, insolvency law has been the subject of comprehensive reforms in each of the five countries. 100 In contrast, shareholder protection has been adopted in smaller, more frequent steps, which has led to a gradual convergence of legal systems in this area of law.
With respect to worker protection, one can also identify at least four factors that are different from shareholder protection. First, workers are less mobile than investors, with the consequence that different preferences can lead to differences between labor law systems. Second, there is usually only -type A-regulatory competition‖ in labor law. 101 -Type A-regulatory competition‖ means that individuals can only choose a particular legal system if they also take residence in that place. 102 Thus, there is a bundling effect because the residence decision has to balance all relevant legal and non-legal factors. 103 Conversely, -type B-regulatory competition‖ is stronger because individuals can choose legal rules in a piece-by-piece manner by taking residence in one state and choosing the law of another. 104 In labor law, however, the latter is not possible because the applicable law is usually based on the place where the work is performed (lex loci laboris). 105 Third, the conflict between workers and firms is more contentious than the one between shareholders and directors. 106 Thus, conflicting factors of pressure steer the laws of different countries in different directions. Fourth, there can be strong path dependencies in labor law, which may hold legislators back from an internationally uniform mode of proceeding-labor law is often endogenized by the economic and political contexts of a particular country. 107 Moreover, different ideologies and law-making procedures play a greater role than in the laws on shareholder and creditor protection. 108
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has used a new quantitative methodology in order to answer the question of whether there has been convergence, divergence, or persistence of the legal rules that shape country-level differences in corporate governance. The main result is that one must distinguish between different areas of law-the laws have converged in shareholder protection, diverged in worker protection, and evened out in creditor protection.
This Article has also examined how this relates to the common law-civil law distinction. In the relationship between Germany and France, and the United Kingdom and India, the belonging of countries to one legal origin still matters. However, this does not lead to a -lock in‖ because there have been a number of instances in which the differences between countries of the same legal origin have increased significantly. These changes have, for instance, been a result of EU law and political developments.
Moreover, the position of the United States is that of an outlier because its law strongly differs from the other four legal systems.
Finally, one can look at the relationship between both distinctions (the different types of protection and the different countries). Some similarities within common law and civil law countries have been found that support the protection of workers. However, there has also been some divergence between French and German, and U.S. and U.K., labor law. Furthermore, Indian labor law is not particularly close to U.K. or U.S. labor law. With respect to the protection of shareholders and creditors, German and French law were relatively close; however, this has changed in the course of the last few decades. In contrast to this, U.K. and U.S. law on these issues were already relatively dissimilar in 1970, whereas the similarities in the protection of shareholders and creditors in the U.K. and India have mainly persisted.
Future research must address how these legal differences relate to corporate governance and finance at the firm level. The current empirical literature usually examines only whether the strength of legal protection (for instance, shareholder protection) is reflected in a country's financial development. 109 The data on differences between countries presented in this Article may, however, also be used for econometric purposes. For instance, one can examine whether the convergence of legal systems in shareholder law has decreased the cost of foreign investment, or one can take the position of investors in a specific country and examine the hypothesis that a legal system that converges with U.S. law attracts more American investors.
